Tuesday 15 September 2009

Dealing with the internal terrorist threat: the case for deportation of suspects


In the period preceding the outbreak of World War Two, the British government had to decide what to do with tens of thousands of "enemy aliens" – mainly Germans, Austrians and Italians living in Britain – and also British citizens of foreign descent. Though it seemed likely that most of these people were no threat, still it was the duty of government to address the real possibility of sabotage and espionage by fifth columnists amongst their number.

Thus, the
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939, which included measures for maintaining public safety and order in wartime Britain, specifically allowed for the internment of people considered potentially dangerous to national security.

To identify these individuals, special tribunals were set up. The tribunals divided the people passing before them into three classes: those in class A (high risk) were to be interned immediately, whilst those in class B (low risk) would be monitored and restricted, and those in class C (no risk, the vast majority) would be allowed to go free.

Initially, there were only about 600 internees, however during 1940 an increasingly panicky public mood (engendered by Nazi conquests in mainland Europe and by Italy's entry into the war) led to the internment of all from class B and most from class C. The majority of internees were eventually taken by boat to civilian internment camps on the Isle of Man.


The internment process was by no means perfect: many bona fide refugees were interned, to be released only months later when effective screening was introduced. Nevertheless, it succeeded in neutralizing some very dangerous people, and though we will never know how many hostile acts were prevented, it seems likely that many lives were saved as a result. Most notable from a modern perspective is the refusal of the government of the day to compromise in safeguarding the majority British population, even though it meant temporarily curtailing the freedoms of certain ethnic minorities.


Seventy years on, we face a very different kind of war, called by our political masters
"The War on Terror", and by moslem ideologues committed to violent retribution against the West, simply "jihad". A recent article by Jon Clements reports that some 2,000 suspected jihadis are currently being monitored by the British security services. They range from youngsters, indoctrinated by Islamist extremists operating within mosques, madrasahs and youth clubs, to experienced al-Qaeda men, whose number is to be augmented in the coming months by the release from jail of more than 30 high-risk extremists.

Comparing the present situation with 1939, the threat from would-be martyrs is perhaps more concrete than the wartime threat from Nazi infiltrators. Then, the British government held the physical safety of our own citizens to be paramount; today, the government prioritizes the "human rights" of killers. Then, public exhortations of violence against the native population were rare; today, they are commonplace. Then, communications among plotters were limited in range and easily intercepted; now, they are global and often untraceable. Then, enemy aliens often operated alone; today, many home-grown terrorists are harboured by established communities.


Most tellingly of all, we have chilling proof of the intentions of our modern-day
"fifth column": from the carnage of the 7/7 London bombings; from the thwarted radioactive "dirty bomb" plot; from al-Qaeda's grooming of British-born children for suicide missions; from Omar Khyam's evil plan to raze The Ministry of Sound nightclub; from the "Lucozade" bombers' airliner plot, and from other terror schemes foiled at the eleventh hour only by the Grace of God and by the diligence of MI5 officers.

According to
Jon Clements, the highest-priority anti-terror surveillance operations can involve more than 30 undercover officers working 12-hour shifts over weeks or months, and there is always a good deal of associated bureaucratic and legal work. But even if the typical case is substantially less greedy of resources, multiplying its costs by the 2,000 plus operations currently active yields an annual total running into tens of millions, perhaps hundreds of millions, of pounds. Such open-ended costs of monitoring ever-growing numbers of terror suspects are part of the huge monetary price we way for immigration from the Islamic World.

The
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act was repealed in 1959. A system of control orders is the government's present mechanism for restricting terror suspects who cannot be prosecuted. The system is deeply flawed: several of those subject to control orders have absconded, and some orders have been revoked or quashed by legal challenges, releasing high-level suspects back into the community. Considering the potential dangers posed by these individuals, and by countless other followers of the doctrine of holy war now at large, there is surely a good case for instituting powers that would enable the isolation and rapid expulsion of those believed by the security services to pose a mortal threat.

In my view, national security in the continuing war on terror demands a return to a more robust approach of the kind that proved effective in 1939, which relied not on irrefutable proof but on the informed opinion of security experts. Such a mechanism, putting the safety of citizens above the rights of terrorist suspects, might use the following, updated classification scheme:

class A (high risk), suspected terrorists and their supporters, and all preachers of hate; also muggers, rapists, rioters and others having a record of involvement in "street jihad";
class B (low risk), those on the fringes of Islamist extremism, typically brainwashed young people deemed still capable of integration into British society;
class C (no risk), moderate, integrated moslems, opposed to extremism (I remain open to the possibility!).

I believe that all members of class A should be deported rather than imprisoned/interned, because experience here and across Europe tells us that such individuals, implacably hostile to Western ways, are unassimilable, and that money spent on incarceration with a view to rehabilitation is money wasted. Moreover, we have seen that within the segregated, sectarian environments of the British penal system, there is the risk of young or vulnerable inmates falling under their spell.

Deportation of class A cases shouldn't be seen as cruel or inhumane: many moslems abroad regard such people as heroes, so we needn't anticipate difficulties in finding them and their families nice new homes, further east.


Members of class B should be helped to integrate into British society through social and educational programmes, led perhaps by members of class C. Thus, we might see some of those arrogant and aggressive youths, who have been so busy turning their neighbourhoods into no-go zones for "
infidels" and emergency services, gradually find their way back into the mainstream.

In summary then, I believe that we should learn the lesson of World War Two: that individuals considered to pose serious dangers to internal security can be effectively dealt with by removing them – humanely, but without fuss, without trial – from the places where they can do harm. I believe that any government serious about tackling terror should commit itself to the speedy identification and deportation of home-grown and foreign jihadis currently resident in Britain, and to the tightening of immigration controls so as to prevent their replacement by a new generation of fanatics.


Such measures might normally be regarded as unacceptably harsh; however, ours is not a normal situation but – like that of 1939 – one of imminent, extreme danger, where tough measures in the interest of public safety are fully justified.

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